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Earnings Management by Non-Profit Organisations: Evidence from UK Charities 
 
Summary at a glance (50 words) 
This study aims to investigate whether UK charities are engaged in earnings management. We 
found that UK charities use discretionary accruals to drive their financial results toward a zero 
level and there is an association between leverage and earnings management practice. 
Furthermore, earnings management is influenced by the organisational size.   
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Abstract 
Informed by stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory, this paper investigates 
whether United Kingdom (UK) charities are engaged in earnings management practices. 
Based on a sample of 1414 charities over a five-year p riod (2008–2012) this study firstly 
finds that UK charities use discretionary accruals to drive their financial results toward a zero 
surplus/deficit; this result also reveals that the distribution of reported earnings around zero is 
prevalent amongst UK charities. In addition, in contrast to prior findings, the empirical results 
point to a significant association between leverage nd earnings management behaviour by 
charities. Lastly, this study also finds that the practice of earnings management is influenced 
by non-profit organizational size. 
Keywords: Earnings management; non-profit organisations; charities; leverage; stakeholder 
theory; resource dependence theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings management remains one of the crucial resea ch areas of accounting practice. 
Much of the work has analysed the extent of earnings management, techniques used to 
manage earnings, motivations for managing earnings, and the consequences of earnings 
management, as well as policy recommendations aimed at curbing earnings management 
activities in the for-profit sector (Schipper, 1989; Jones, 1991; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Roychowdhury, 2006; Shubita, 2012; 
Walker, 2013; Miloud, 2014). However, there has been relatively less scrutiny in the case of 
non-profit organizations (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and 
Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 2013). Consequently, this paper focuses on the financial accounting 
practices of non-profit organizations (NPOs) in theUK, with specific attention to the practice 
of earnings management. 
Admittedly, a limited number of empirical studies has already found evidence of 
earnings management (also financial disclosure management and/or accounting manipulation) 
in non-profit settings (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Jones and Roberts, 2006; Ballantine et al., 
2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 2013; Boterenbrood, 2014; Vermeer t al., 
2014). In the specific case of the UK, a research gap exists since there has been no 
comprehensive study of earnings management in UK charities1, and the closest relevant study 
(Ballantine et al. (2007) focused only on quasi-public bodies (English NHS Trusts). As in the 
case of several EM studies in other countries (Yetman, 2001; Leone and Van Horn, 2005), the 
focus has remained on idiosyncratic settings (such as hospitals) rather than on the broader 
constituency of larger NPOs that have adopted accruls-based accounting conventions. The 
case of the UK is of particular relevance in terms of its extensive attempts in developing and 
implementing a robust regulatory framework and a comm n set of accounting practices, 
typified by the numerous iterations of the Statement of Recommended Practice (Charity 
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Commission, 2005), resulting from concerns about accountability, transparency and 
confidence in the activities of the charitable sector (Hyndman and McMahon, 2010). While 
Verbruggen and Christiaens (2012)’s study explored th  data of Belgian non-profits that are 
highly subsidized by the government and their research had a limitation in terms of testing the 
earnings management differences among specific sector  of Belgian NPOs, this study focuses 
on UK charities which generate different sources of funding from private donors and from 
commercial activities. In addition, this paper uses a large dataset covering numerous 
charitable sectors. Our study is also motivated by reports from the UK Charity Commission 
(2013a, 2014) stating that there were more than 3,000 compliance cases over a period of two 
years; of which accounting issues were one of the most common problems dealt with by the 
regulator, for example, some charities2 were accused of providing misleading financial 
information. This leads to our main research question : Do UK charities engage in earnings 
management practices?  
From a theoretical standpoint, prior NPO-related studies have generally applied 
agency theory (Krishnan et al. 2006, Jegers 2010, Jegers 2013) to examine the extent of 
earnings management practices in such settings. Thi suggests that earnings management is 
encouraged by self-interested agents. However, this paper argues that broader motivations are 
at play in terms of the role accounting information plays in delivering accountability, 
transparency, reputation and confidence to a wide array of stakeholders. Furthermore, NPOs’ 
access to funds in the form of voluntary income, charitable income and non-financial 
resources (e.g. donations in kind, volunteer labour) is notoriously volatile, implying 
continuous and significant efforts in managing external relationships and dependencies 
(Connolly and Hyndman 2013). In this regard, stakeholder theory and resource dependence 
theory are adopted as the framework underpinning the likely motivation and determinants of 
earnings management by charities. Empirically, thisstudy relies on data from 1414 charities 
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selected on a stratified basis in relation to size (total income) and classified in eleven 
subsectors of activities (based on the International Cl ssification of Non-Profit Organisation) 
over a five-year period (2008-2012). The results fir tly suggest that UK charities use 
discretionary accruals in order to drive their financi l results toward a zero surplus/deficit. 
This result is consistent with the frequency distribution of reported earnings, which shows that 
a number of charities with negative unmanaged deficits have reported little surpluses after 
applying discretionary accruals. Secondly, the empirical results reveal a negative association 
between leverage and earnings management behaviour. Thirdly, the results show that 
organizational size has an influence on earnings management practice, whereby larger 
organizations are less likely to be involved in earnings management practice. This paper also 
studies the impact of alternative types of resources (different source of income) on earnings 
management practice but the results are not significa t.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several w ys. First, it provides evidence 
from a large and diverse UK sample that charities appe r to apply discretionary accruals to 
manage their accounting results. Although there is no pecific requirement to achieve a break-
even position, charities are likely to complete theyear with a little surplus (the difference 
between total income and total expenses). This finding is important because potential donors 
and funders partly rely on accounting information to underpin their decision to provide 
financial and non-financial support to charities. Relatedly, central government and local 
authorities may be led into misallocating their service contracts to charities due a reliance on 
accounting information to gauge the sustainability of the service provider. In addition, the 
finding is important for the main UK charity regulator (Charity Commission) in the 
monitoring of charities and to enhance their public a countability. Second, whilst the 
academic and practitioner literature (for example, Connolly and Hyndman (2001), Hyndman 
and McMahon (2010) has debated extensively on the development and implementation of 
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appropriate accounting standards in the UK charitable sector (the Statement of Recommend 
Practice) with a view to improving accountability, ransparency, efficiency and effectiveness, 
our findings have an important implication for policy in that the introduction of accruals-
based accounting regulation, as in the case of private sector settings, does provide the 
opportunity for discretionary accruals. Finally, the paper also contributes to the theoretical 
perspective on earnings management practices by considering the relevance of stakeholder 
theory and resource dependence theory to underpin the study of the factors underlying the 
extent of such practices by non-profit organisations (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012). 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the institutional setting 
and the literature on earnings management in NPOs, followed by the theoretical framework 
and hypotheses in Section 3. The data and models usd to measure earnings management are 
presented in Section 4. Section 5 describes and analyses the empirical results and Section 6 
concludes the paper with a discussion of the findings, implications, limitations and 
propositions for further work on earnings management practices by NPOs.  
2. Institutional settings and review of prior literature 
a. UK charity settings and regulatory framework 
By June 2017 there were over 166,000 registered charities in the England and Wales with a 
total annual income of approximately £74 billion3. In 2015, the sector contributed about £12.2 
billion in terms of gross value added, equivalent to almost 0.9% of the gross value added of 
all industries in the UK and employed about 800,000 people (2.7% of the total UK 
workforce)4.  
The regulatory framework for charity accounting and reporting regulation in the UK has 
experienced significant development, notably since th  study by Bird and Morgan-Jones 
(1981) who found extensive accounting inconsistencies and unclear policies by charities. 
Consequently, a number of Statements of Recommended Practice5 have been published and 
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revised in 1988, 1995, 2000 (Connolly and Hyndman, 2001), 2005 and more recently in 2014, 
and supplements the accounting and reporting requirments of the Charities Act (1960, 1993, 
2006, and 2011). As stated by the Charity Commission (2014), the Statements of 
Recommended Practice aims to improve the quality of financial reporting by charities and 
increase the transparency of information about the c arity’s financial performance and 
financial position, for the benefit of a wide range of stakeholders. One of the major 
developments has been the adoption of accruals-based accounting, which requires charities to 
report their income and expenditure on the basis of occurred transactions, rather than when 
charities receive and/or spend cash. According to Charity Act 1993 (England and Wales) and 
Charities and Trustee investment Act 2005 (Scotland), since February 2005, accruals-based 
accounting was mandatory for all charitable companies and non-company charities with gross 
income exceeding £100,000 (Charity Commission, 2005). However, the application of accrual 
accounting may arguably provide reporting organisations with the opportunity to exploit the 
inherent flexibility of discretionary accruals (Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 2013), 
evidence of which is summarised in the following section. 
b. Earnings management by non-profit organisations 
The definition of earnings management in the non-profit sector has not been explicitly defined 
but Healy and Wahlen’s (1999) definition about earnings management is generally cited in 
NPO studies (Ballantine et al. 2007, Verbruggen and Christiaens 2012). These authors 
support the view that earnings management could potentially mislead stakeholders who use 
financial information to assess the organisation’s performance or to make grant decisions. 
Therefore, the terminology of earnings management covers a wider set accounting issues 
which may affect the quality of the financial information. Instead of using earnings 
management terminology, a different term (‘financial disclosure management’) has been used 
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to describe the practice of managing accounting figures, either by using accrual accounting or 
discretion in cost allocation practices (Hofmann and McSwain, 2013).    
Several studies in the non-profit context (Khumawala et al., 2005; Jones and Roberts, 2006; 
Krishnan et al., 2006; Keating et al., 2008; Tinkelman, 2009; Yetman and Yetman, 2013; 
Garven et al., 2016) adopt agency theory-led perspectives o argue that NPO executives may 
adjust accounting numbers or alter the reporting process with a view to improving the 
efficiency ratio (which is normally measured by theotal money spent on charitable activities 
over total income or total expense of NPOs. A higher reported efficiency ratio is generally 
associated to managerial competence, which in turn could improve organisational reputation 
and lead to higher donations (Tinkelman, 1999). In particular, charities were found to make 
substantial changes to programme ratios by using joint cost allocations and misclassifying 
fundraising expenses (Jones and Roberts, 2006; Keating e  al., 2008) or reported zero 
fundraising expenses although they undertook fundraising activities (Krishnan et al., 2006) in 
order to give the impression that donor money has been used for worthy causes or to hide 
potential inefficiencies in fundraising activities.  
Furthermore, a number of studies contend that the motivation for NPOs to modify 
reported earnings may arise due to tax avoidance matters or to avoid interference from the 
regulator (political costs). In this respect, cost allocation and cost ‘shifting’ are preferable 
methods that have been used by a number of organisatio  for misreporting expenditures and 
adjusting earnings in order to re-allocate expenses from their tax-exempt activities to the 
taxable activities with a purpose of reducing tax li bi ities (Yetman, 2001; Omer and Yetman, 
2003; Hofmann, 2007; Omer and Yetman, 2007). NPOs are also found to report small 
surpluses and deficits around zero (Leone and Van Hor , 2005; Ballantine t al., 2007). They 
are also involved in managing accrual accounting (Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 
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2013) and real earnings management activities (Eldenburg et al., 2011) in order to meet 
statutory obligations and government accounting regulations. 
This review indicates that there is some empirical evidence of NPOs engaged in 
earnings management but the evidence is limited to very few countries or to specific sectors. 
For instance, the ‘zero profit’ acts as a means for NPOs to imply that they have spent all 
incoming resources in order to fulfil their charitable purpose as well as a signal of requiring 
further resources (Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012). However, evidence of this behaviour 
has not been considered for the wider constituency of UK organisations, particularly in the 
period post-2005 following the implementation of the updated Statement of Recommended 
Practice (SORP, 2005), the development of guidelines for charity financial accountability and 
governance and monitoring activities by the Charity Commission. For larger UK charities 
(total income in excess of £250,000), there is the possibility that some items, such as 
depreciation or current assets, may be open to discretionary practices (Jegers, 2013). A so-
called ‘active’ application of accrual accounting may result in an upwards or downwards 
movement in surplus/deficit, depending upon manageri l or organisational 
intentions/characteristics but this also has yet to be examined in the UK context.  
3. Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
a. Theoretical background 
Agency theory has typically been the dominant perspective in the NPO accounting 
literature (Van Puyvelde et al, 2012) but its arguably restrictive assumptions about the agent’s 
characteristics such as self-interest, bounded ration lity and risk aversion are not always 
applicable to NPOs. Furthermore, it is often difficult to clearly identify the ultimate owner(s) 
and agent (Jegers, 2013; Newton, 2015) since some NPOs do not have a ‘membership’ base 
(akin to shareholders). In effect, the ‘principal-agent relationship’ in the NPO sector is 
potentially more eclectic than in the corporate sector and actors may have a varied set of 
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motivations and behaviours underlying organisational choice and policies (including the use 
of accounting discretion). 
Consequently, we draw from stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory to 
conceptualise the different behaviours and motivations underlying the use (and production) of 
financial accounting information by NPOs. A stakeholder of an organisation is defined by 
Freeman (2010) as anyone who can affect or is affected by the organisation. This suggests 
that all groups or individuals who belong to NPOs and outsiders, with inter-relationships to 
the organisation can be considered as stakeholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers, 
banks, regulators, volunteers and beneficiaries. These stakeholders do have a direct effect 
on/from the organisation. To classify alternative group of stakeholders, Mitchell et al. (1997) 
for example proposed three stakeholder attributes: (1) the power to influence the firm, (2) the 
legitimacy of relationship with the firm, and (3) the urgency of claim on the firm. Depending 
on one, two or three attributes, the organisation identifies who is the salient stakeholder and 
seeks to satisfy the expectations of the key stakehold r(s) at this particular point of time. This 
suggests a rather flexible approach by organisations whereby accounting discretion or policies 
may be adopted to respond to a salient stakeholder. 
According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), stakeholder theory encompasses three 
different viewpoints, namely descriptive/empirical, instrumental, and normative. The 
instrumental stakeholder theory is relied upon to identify the links between stakeholder 
management and the achievement of organisational objectives. The instrumental stakeholder 
theory is supported by many authors (Hillman and Keim 2001, Kaler 2003) in a situation 
when attention to a specific stakeholder can impact on the achievement of organisation’s 
goals. This theory could this be applied to explain earnings management practice in the non-
profit sector, where NPOs operate in tandem with different stakeholders (such as donors, 
regulators, government, volunteers, beneficiaries), to meet stakeholder expectations, including 
12 
 
the need to comply with legitimate regulations (Conn lly et al. 2013). Since a number of 
stakeholders engage with NPOs for different interess, management might intentionally 
manage accounting policies and accounting figures in order to satisfy the expectations of 
these specific stakeholders.  
For example, Tinkelman (1999) suggested that donors might be interested in the 
efficiency performance of NPOs since a high efficien y ratio (which might be measured by 
programme ratio or fundraising expense ratio, how much money have been spent on 
charitable activities in compare with money spent o fundraising (admin) activities) may 
signal that donated funds have been used appropriately; consequently, more money has been 
spent on charitable activities, thereby leading to m re donations. In a similar vein, 
governments or regulators may be interested in the NPOs level of compliance  as a result of 
increased political scrutiny and accountability towards the taxpayer (Ballantine et al. 2007). 
The compliance of NPOs might be demonstrated through a commitment with charitable and 
not for profit objectives and missions, where charities and NPOs ensure their funds and grants 
reach the relevant beneficiaries. Beattie and Jetty (2009) also contend that charities appear to 
prioritize some stakeholders (e.g. donors, regulators) when preparing financial reports, 
because these stakeholders have power, legitimacy and urgent claims on charities. An 
emphasis on salient stakeholders can also imply a relationship between those who can offer 
resources to organisations that are financially vulnerable or susceptible to an uncertain 
environment.   
In addition, in line with resource dependence theory, ganisations respond in specific 
ways when confronted to the demands of interest groups upon which the organisations depend 
for resources and support in order to reduce enviromental uncertainty and dependence 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). NPOs are not an exception because they operate in such a closed 
relationship and ‘are dependent upon continuing exchanges with the environments in which 
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they operate’ (Heimovics and Herman 1993: 425). NPOs are not isolated from their 
environment, and their operation is largely dependent upon the flow of resources from outside 
(Heimovics and Herman 1993). Due to increasing competition within the non-profit sector, 
coupled with a decline in funding and fundraising, the negative consequences of this context 
may lead to changes in organisational mission, culture, structures and routines (Dolnicar et al., 
2008). According to the NCVO6 (2012), UK charities lost over £1.3 billion in income from 
government as spending cuts (around 8.8%) materialized during financial year 2011/2012. 
This spending cut has severely impacted on charity operations whilst the demand for public 
service continues to grow, whereby ‘many charities face the very real challenge of having to 
do more with less, and in some cases nothing’ (NCVO, 2012, p. 4). This requires charities to 
secure other type of resources to retain their operations. To cope with those challenges and to 
target the inflow funds for operations, charity executives may over- or understate accounting 
figures in order to influence users of financial reports (Tinkelman, 1999; Buchheit and 
Parsons, 2006). In addition, Carpenter and Feroz (2001) suggest that organisations choose 
certain accounting practices not merely because these practices applications might be the 
rational way to account for the use of funds, but also because those methods are a socially 
accepted and legitimate way to account for the use of resources. As an illustration, 
Verbruggen et al. (2011) contends that NPOs increase their compliance to accounting 
regulation in cases where they rely more on governmntal resources and financial loans; with 
a view to safeguarding the flow of resources from government.  
The probability of involving in managing accounting fi ures in order to secure the 
resources can be associated to the flexibility of accounting practices, or can also arise due to 
the ambiguity in the treatment of accounting items (e.g. accrual accounting or joint-cost 
allocation). In many cases, it also appears that donors do not pay attention to detailed items 
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disclosed in financial statements (Khumawala et al., 2005). Therefore, trustees and managers 
may be motivated in seeking a favourable bottom-line by engaging in earnings management. 
b. Hypothesis development 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, many UK charities have been facing 
funding gaps following the government’s decision to reduce public sector spending whilst 
having to deal with an increasing demand for their s rvices (National Council for Voluntary 
Organisations, 2012). Moreover, many charities have be n affected by the global economic 
recession as a result of the fall in individual donations by nearly £1 billion between 2008 and 
2009, while the demand for services increased by over 17%. More than eight out of ten 
charities believe their sector is facing a crisis, and 40% of charities fear they will close down 
unless there is an economic improvement7. It suggested that charities have faced or are facing 
significant difficulties with an almost concurrent decline in their two main income resources 
(donations and governmental grants/contracts). Therefore, in line with the implications of 
stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory, this context can lead to increased 
pressures upon charity trustees and managers to avoid or lessen the uncertainties induced by 
the shortage of resources while still attempting to fulfil the charitable services expected by 
society and stakeholders. This may require charities to perform more effectively or 
demonstrate more convincingly that their performance is sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
from different stakeholders. Informed by findings from previous studies (Yetman, 2001; 
Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Jones and Roberts, 2006; Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and 
Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 2013) and the theoretical framework, this study formulates three 
specific accounting-led hypotheses to investigate th  extent to which UK charities are 
involved in earnings management.  
First, if charities conclude the financial year with a large surplus, this is consequently 
transferred to an accumulated fund and brought forward to subsequent years as required by 
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SORP 2005. This might negatively impact on the level of donations and the amount of 
fundraising in subsequent years as stakeholders reali e that those charities do not need further 
support (Beattie and Jetty, 2009). Conversely, the reporting of a large deficit may impact on 
the going concern status of charities because incoming resources are not enough to cover 
resources expended, and trustees may experience difficulties in retaining the level of existing 
operations. This may in turn have an impact on the profile and reputation of the trustees, 
leading in some cases to the termination of executive contracts (Leone and Van Horn, 2005). 
Therefore, the instrumental variant of stakeholder th ory suggests that charities are motivated 
to report accounting information that may be interpr ted in a favourable light by key 
stakeholders, such as the zero earnings level benchmark required by legal regulators and 
sponsors (Ballantine t al., 2007). In a similar vein, resource dependence theory posits that the 
charities may be engaged in such practices to address uncertainties about future support and 
pre-empt a reduction in future income. Therefore, th  first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Reported earnings8 of UK charities (surpluses/deficits) are narrowly distributed 
around zero. 
A zero-bottom line may seem to be a desirable operational position for many NPOs, 
since this figure may reflect that charities have utilised all their donated funds and grants 
provided by stakeholders. From a statutory perspective, charities are restricted from 
distributing surpluses to their ‘owners’ (members o trustees); rather, they exist for the aim of 
charitable purposes (Charities Act, 2011). They are expected to execute charitable projects on 
the basis of their available resources. To the bestof our knowledge, however, there is no 
statutory requirement for UK charities to achieve a break-even, except for a regulation 
applicable to English NHS Hospital Trusts (Ballantine et al., 2007). Similar cases have been 
explored in a non-profit context (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Ballantine et al., 2007; 
Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012) and in the public sector (Ferreira et al., 2013). On the one 
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hand, charities may in practice face pressures to achieve an ‘ideal break-even’, because if 
organisations operate under severe resource deficits, th s not only obstructs their ability to 
maintain ongoing operations for the future, but also brings the risk of being forced to close 
down (Dodd, 2014). On the other hand, charities with excessive surpluses might be 
reconsidered by stakeholders in term of financial support, managerial performance evaluation 
and regulatory intervention (Leone and Van Horn, 2005). Previous studies (Leone and Van 
Horn, 2005; Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012) found that NPOs 
intentionally manage their bottom line toward zero in order to achieve a target or implicitly 
signal their capability in financial management. The missions of NPOs and charities are not 
changed by time as they principally aim to achieve their charitable missions and objectives. 
However, due to an increasing pressure from various stakeholders (regulator, donors, 
government and beneficiaries), NPOs and charities may be motivated to take advantage of 
accrual accounting to manage the bottom line (earnings) upwards or downwards in order to 
achieve the zero-profit level. Therefore, the second hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: UK charities manage earnings toward ze o. 
Numerous studies in the for-profit sector suggest that leverage (and the covenants 
underlying debt obligations) is one of the main reasons leading businesses to be involved in 
earnings management (Jaggi and Picheng, 2002; Saleh and Ahmed, 2005) - due to the 
financial and reputational costs of debt defaults or due to the opportunity to enhance 
service/activities to minimise negative perceptions f the organisation. Recently, Vermeer et 
al. (2014) found that US non-profits with high financial leverage appear to manage actuarial 
assumptions in order to reduce reported liabilities and expenses. Yet, results from recent 
studies have not been consistent and/or significant in order to be able draw conclusions about 
a leverage effect (Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 2013).  
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In terms of the UK charity context, James (2014) repo ted that more than one in eight 
of the UK’s largest charities have negative working capital (current liabilities exceeding 
current assets). In such circumstances the Charity Commission requires charities to provide an 
explanation in their annual reports, along with like y solutions to address the situation. These 
charities may also be investigated by the Charity Commission. In the worst cases, charities 
might be forced to liquidate or close down because of their inability to cover their liabilities. 
This contextual factor implies that charities with a igher level of liabilities will therefore face 
a higher burden of regulatory scrutiny. Consistent with resource dependence theory and 
stakeholder theory, charities may aim to deflect any regulatory intervention and preserve their 
positive image with funders and other resource providers. Executives and managers may 
consequently be keen to adjust or intentionally manage accounting figures (the reported 
surplus/deficits) in order to meet fund provider exp ctations. Alternatively, a high proportion 
of debts may be interpreted another way, in that UK charities are in a difficult period in terms 
of fundraising. In many cases charities use debt and credit facilities to support their operation 
due to the lack of sufficient income and reserves. Consequently, it is plausible that charities 
with higher indebtedness may seek to improve the charity’s public performance 
(Boterenbrood, 2014). According to Boateng et al., (2016), the public performance could be 
considered by financial performance (programme spending ratio, fundraising expenses) or 
non-financial performance (quality of service, customer satisfaction). In light of these 
different reasons and the limited empirical evidence, this study formulates the third 
hypothesis that:  
Hypothesis 3: Charity leverage is significantly associated with the extent of earnings 
management. 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), the extent o which an organisation depends 
on others can be determined by the significance and co centration of resources provided. The 
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fewer sources of income or the greater the dominance of few funders, the more organisations 
become highly dependent on, and are beholden to those providers for survival (Froelich, 
1999). In a similar vein, in the UK charity context, charity operations are significantly 
dependent on several sources of income, such as income from charitable activities (called as 
charitable income), consisting of grants from central and local government for delivering 
public services, fee-charge from charitable services, and voluntary income comprising 
incoming resources generated from gifts, donations, legacies provided by the founders, 
patrons, supporters, the general public and business as well as grants from government and 
membership subscriptions, sponsorships with donatio substance. Voluntary income is 
normally given for free from donors, supporters and grant-makers with the purpose of 
enhancing charitable activities performed by charities9. However, whether such dependence 
affects financial reporting behaviour, as per resource dependence theory, has not been 
extensively studied. For instance, Verbruggen and Christiaens (2012) analysed the influence 
of donations and governmental subsidies on earnings management practices and found no 
significant effect for funds donated from individuals and organisations, whilst grants from 
government were negatively associated to earnings management practice (Verbruggen and 
Christiaens, 2012). However, this relationship remains debatable because Jegers (2013) then 
found no significant impact of government subsidies on earnings management. Lastly, UK 
charities comprise of a number of charitable sectors, such as education, healthcare, 
environment and religion, which have different features and stakeholders, with specific levels 
of influence and pressure. This might consequently impact on managerial behaviour in 
relation to earnings management. In order to evaluate the impact of sectoral differences on 
earnings management practice, this study considers the inclusion of control variables to 
explore any sectoral impact, which is discussed further at model and variables section.     
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4. Research methodology 
a. Model and variables 
This study relies on secondary data extracted from a database managed by the UK 
Charity Commission10. The database comprises all the financial information (the balance 
sheets and statement of financial activities) of more than 9,000 UK charities for a six-year 
period from 2007 to 2012 (with minimum income of £500,000). In average, the annual 
income of these charities accounted for nearly 90% of the annual income of all UK charities. 
The selection of this specific period of time also all wed for a consideration of the impact (if 
any) of the global financial crisis on NPOs’ accounting practice. 
A multivariate regression was applied to examine the relationship between earnings 
management and influencing factors, such as break-even target, significance of funding 
sources, leverage level, and the types of charitable ctivities. In order to test for the possible 
existence of earnings management practice, discretionary accruals was considered as a proxy 
for earnings management (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 
2012). According to these authors, discretionary accruals represents managerial interventions 
in financial reporting policies in order to change th  reported financial results. Discretionary 
accruals is therefore used to examine the earnings management phenomenon by UK charities. 
To test for the first hypothesis, an earnings frequency distribution was carried out to 
examine the phenomenon of reported earnings. The distribution of earnings is then analysed 
to identify the practice of earnings management. The presence of earnings management is 
indicated by an abnormal distribution of reported earnings close to zero (Leone and Van Horn, 
2005; Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012). The frequency distribution 
is carried out alongside a comparison of pre-managed earnings (earnings without 
discretionary accruals) and reported earnings, in line with the procedures by Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) as explained below.  
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Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) analysed the histograms of the scaled earnings change 
variable with histogram interval widths of 0.0025 for the range -0.15 to +0.15. A bell-shaped 
distribution with an irregularity near zero, with te distribution of slightly positive reported 
earnings beyond normal expectations while small losses are abnormally low relative to 
adjacent regions of distribution, tends to indicate th  practice of earnings management 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Indjejikian et al., 2014). In addition, in the context of non-
profit organizations, Leone and Van Horn (2005) also plotted histograms to identify an 
abnormal distribution of US hospital earnings positively around zero. Reported earnings are 
determined as the difference between total resource in ome and total resource expended. 
However, since UK charities are varied in terms of income and asset magnitude, the earnings 
ratio (earnings divided by total assets) will be usd to mitigate for the differences in NPO size. 
 
The Jones (1991) model was used to estimate discretionary accruals (DA), which are 
residuals from the following model (model 1). This model has been used extensively in for-
profit and the non-profit sectors (DeFond and Jiamblvo, 1994; Dechow et al., 1995; Peasnell 
et al., 2000; Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Atieh and Hussain, 2012; Verbruggen and 
Christiaens, 2012). 
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Where, ACit is charity i’s total accruals calculated by the change in non-cash current assets 
minus the change in current liabilities from year t-1 to year t, minus depreciation expense for 
year t (ACit = [Current asset - Cash] -   [Current liability] - Depreciation & 
Amortization expenses).  
REVit is the change in total income resources from year t-1 to year t by charity i.  
PPEit is gross depreciable assets in year t of charity i.  
TAit-1 is total asset year t-1 [determined by total non-current asset + (plus) total current assets]. 
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Admittedly, there are several other models to estimate discretionary accruals such as the 
Modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995), the Dechow and Dichev approach (Dechow and 
Dichev 2002) or the Francis model (Francis et al. 2005). However, cash flow information is 
not compulsory for charities to disclose and the accounts receivable item appears to be 
insignificant in the financial statements of UK NPOs. This suggested that the application of 
those models may not generate more reliable results compared to the Jones (1991) model. 
Furthermore, the Jones (1991) model has been applied by Leone and Van Horn (2005) and 
Verbruggen and Christiaens (2012) in the non-profit context as well as in the corporate sector 
(Peasnell et al. 2000, Atieh and Hussain 2012). Furthermore, following Leone and Van Horn 
(2005), this study adopts the Jones (1991) model in the non-profit context, where the 
existence of accruals in relation to revenue and depreciation might be construed as a strategy 
by large NPOs (whose total income exceeds £250,000) to manage the bottom line (Charity 
Commission, 2005). 
To test hypotheses 2 and 3, this paper uses the following model (model 2) which was 
developed from Leone and Van Horn (2005) and Verbruggen and Christiaens (2012).  
DA it = a0 + a1EBDA it + a2EARNINGS i t-1 + a3DA it-1 + a4 LEV it + a5SEC_factor + 
a6CHAR_INC it + a7VOL_INC it + + a8Sizeit + e    (2) 
 
Whereby: DA is discretionary accruals; EBDA is earnings before discretionary accrual; 
EARNINGS is net income of previous year; LEV is leverage determined by total short-term 
and long-term liabilities divided by previous year total assets; SEC factor is a dummy variable 
presenting sectoral factors; CHAR_INC is a ratio of charitable income over total income; 
VOL_INC is a ratio of voluntary income over total income; and Size is natural logarithm of 
total assets of charity.  
The purpose of this model is to inspect the impact of several factors on earnings 
management practice, and these factors include the results for the current year (earnings 
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before discretionary accruals), the level of credit and borrowings (leverage). This paper also 
considers several control variables, including the significance of the two main sources of 
income, charity size and the different sectors of non-profit activity. The relationship between 
these factors and discretionary accruals seeks to proxy for the motivations with regards to 
earnings management (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012).  
b. Data and sampling 
The data for this paper is directly sourced from the Charity Commission since 
charities have to file their accounts with the regulator11. The database provided by the Charity 
Commission covers approximately 84% of charity total income in England & Wales, and we 
focus on financial information presented on the statement of financial activities and the 
balance sheet for the period 2008-2012. The sampling approach was based on the following: 
(i) all charities with income greater than £10m (835 charities); and (ii) 10% of charities with 
income from £0.5m to £10 m (579 charities) randomly identified on the basis of a 95 percent 
confidence level (Saunders et al., 2012); This resulted in a final figure of 1,4 4 charities or 
7,070 observations on a panel data basis. The combined income of the selected sample 
represents about 55% of the reported income of all ch rities in England and Wales for 2012. 
The reason for selecting charities by size is supported by previous work suggesting 
that larger firms are more likely to be involved in earnings management (Barton and Simko, 
2002; Nelson et al., 2002) because of their higher levels of accounting sophistication and 
greater bargaining power. In the context of non-profit organisations, Jegers (2013) suggests 
that organisational size and level of earnings manipulation are positively associated. In 
addition, although only 10% of smaller charities are selected, the observations account for 
38% of the total selected sample. Finally, charities are classified into 11 sectors based on the 
International Classification of Non-Profit Organisat ons, which was designed by the US 
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Centre for Civil Society Studies at Johns Hopkins University and has been adopted by the 
National Council for Voluntary Organisations for UK charity classification.  
5. Empirical results and analysis 
a. Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the five-year pooled data from 2008 to 2012 are 
summarized in table 1. The mean total assets and mean total income of the charities were 
£57.032 million and £20.719 million respectively. It is notable that mean leverage accounted 
for nearly 30%, while charitable and voluntary income were on average the two main sources 
of income for UK charities, accounting respectively for approximately 58% and 26% of total 
income. This reflects the significant dependence on, and financial support from, a range of 
external stakeholders (sponsors, donors and creditos). The dependence on these two main 
sources of income was generally stable over the period from 2008 to 2012. The charity sector 
does not seen to have been affected by the global financial crisis. Furthermore, the results 
showed a mean surplus for 2008 to 2012, while the mean percentage of earnings over total 
assets was approximately 2%.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the descriptive statistics by sector. There is a notable 
variation in relation to total assets and total income among those groups, representing a 
difference in size amongst selected organizations and sectors. Particularly, group 7 (Law, 
Advocacy and Politics) is the smallest sector with the lowest mean of total assets (£8.3million) 
and smallest mean of total income (£10million), while group 8 (Philanthropic Intermediaries 
and Voluntarism Promotion) is the largest sector with the mean of total assets (£191million) 
(approximately 34 times that of group 7). Charities involved in international activities (group 
9 - International) have the highest mean income, of which voluntary income is a significant 
source (accounting for more than 63%). Theoretically, in accordance with stakeholder theory 
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and resource dependence theory, organisations may behave differently when there is a change 
in external environments related to disparities among stakeholders and variance of 
expectations. Therefore, it is noted that there are considerable differences in terms of the asset 
size, income and the main components of income between the different charitable sectors - 
which might in turn have an effect on EM practices within particular sectors. 
[Table 2 about here] 
b. Hypothesis 1- Earnings distribution analysis 
This paper first analyses the earnings frequency distribution by plotting histograms of 
reported earnings (which have been scaled by total assets to eliminate the variance in charity 
size). To make these comparable to pre-managed earnings, which are calculated by deducting 
discretionary accruals from reported earnings, the data for the distributional analysis is 
conducted for four years from 2009 to 2012. Consistent with the Jones (1991) model of using 
lagged total assets to determine discretionary accru l, our variables of reported earnings and 
pre-managed earnings also use lagged total assets. This leads to a reduction of one year data 
(from five years to four years). However, the number of observations (5,656) remains 
sufficient to understand the reported earnings behaviour of UK charities (Jobome, 2006). 
The reported earnings frequency distribution of 5,656 charity-years from 2009 to 2012, 
before and after applying discretionary accruals is illu trated in figure 1. Overall, the result 
shows that reported earnings have a slight positive mean value of 0.0526. In particular, there 
are more than 3,500 observations reporting small surpluses (around 0.18), while there are 
slightly fewer than 2,000 observations with very small deficits (approximately -0.22). The 
results are consistent with Leone and Van Horn (2005) and Jegers (2013) in that large 
numbers of non-profits with earnings are distributed around zero (e.g. the mean of US 
hospital operating income and Belgian NPO earnings were 2.4% and 2.6% respectively), and 
more of the reported earnings are on the positive side than on the negative side. 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
Alongside a frequency distribution analysis (figure 1), we also conduct another 
frequency distribution analysis of reported earnings of UK charities in the period from 2008-
2012. Our study first shows that about 39% of charities reported earnings between -£250,000 
and £250,000 in the period. This interval is similar to the figure of charities’ reported earnings 
(divided by total assets) i.e. between -2.5% to 2.5%. In this study, we consider an interval of 
reported earnings between -£250,000 and £250,000 as close to zero. The rationale of this 
assumption is initiated by the findings from prior studies as Verbruggen and Christiaens 
(2012) found that Belgian NPOs’ earnings (mean value) were found to be reported around 
2.4% while US hospital earnings (mean value) were around 2.6% (Leone and Van Horn, 
2005). 
A comparison between the frequency distributions of post-managed and pre-managed 
earnings reveals that the means are not significantly different (at the 5% level). However, the 
number of observations with deficits is lower than the number of those with pre-managed 
figures (approximately 1,800 vs. 2,300), and the number with reported surpluses is more than 
pre-managed data (around 3,600 vs. 2,800). This may i ply that many charities rely on 
discretionary accruals to manage earnings upward to achieve a slightly positive result. Overall, 
this result supports hypothesis 1, namely that a significant number of UK charities reported 
earnings narrowly around zero. 
The rationality of this reporting behaviour can be explained as small surpluses or 
deficits may create a good image for charities. Particularly, this could express the competence 
of managers and trustees in operating charities, since on the one hand a small surplus means 
that charities have sufficient funds for their activities and to achieve their stated objectives, 
while on the other hand, if the results are slightly negative this suggests that charities have 
spent their budgeted allocations and may be considered to have met the requirements of 
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sponsors and donors. Furthermore, the surpluses and deficits will be added to (or reduced 
from) the charity reserves. According to paragraph 55 of Statement of Recommended Practice 
2005 (Charity Commission, 2005), and Charities and Reserves (CC19) (Charity Commission, 
2010), charities are required to disclose their reserve policy, as well as consider and explain 
when they have an excess or a shortfall in reserves. Therefore, this may motivate charities to 
use the reported figures to manage their reserve levels to avoid reporting large excesses or 
shortfalls. A result close to zero net income may thus keep reserves at a stable level, and make 
it easier for charities to explain their financial situation compared to unusual increases or 
decreases in reserves. 
Theoretically, from the perspective of stakeholders who support charities, there is an 
expectation that the financial support given to charities will be directed to beneficiaries 
(Breeze, 2010). Therefore, a charity with a large surplus may prompt questions from donors 
about its efficiency, as well as its capability to fully achieve its charitable objectives. This 
may have a negative impact on future resources. Therefor , the managing of surpluses/deficits 
may be a strategy to mitigate environmental uncertainties and relationships with resource 
providers and to manage stakeholder perceptions more generally. 
c. Hypothesis 2: Earnings management towards zero level 
The summary information from table 1 shows that the c arities’ financial results 
before discretionary accruals varied from a -16% deficit to a 31% surplus. Discretionary 
accruals also vary widely from -0.876 to +0.477. This may suggest that a number of charities 
engage in earnings management upwards or downwards in order to achieve their intentional 
targets. However, in order to determine the specific behaviour of charity managers in relation 
to earnings management, an ordinary least squares regression is implemented. Before the 
regression was conducted, the regression diagnostics and Pearson correlation matrix were 
applied to identify issues of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and multicollinearity (Chen 
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and Zhang, 2014)8. The results show a high correlation between voluntary income (VOL_INC) 
and charitable income (CHAR_INC) (-0.798), because they represent the two main 
components of charity income. To ensure that multicol inearity will not impact on the 
multivariate analysis, an additional test using variance inflation factors was conducted to 
assess whether multicollinearity was a matter of concern (Vu, 2008; Chen and Zhang, 2014). 
The result of the variance inflation factors test indicated that multicollinearity was not a 
problem since the maximum value of variance inflation factors was 2.97 (Kennedy, 2003; 
Reheul et al., 2013). 
In addition, an omitted variable test was also performed to determine whether there 
was any excluded variable which might impact on the accuracy of the regression model. 
Ramsey’s regression specification error test was used to implement this test (Vu, 2008), and 
the result indicated that the model may have omitted variables which could impact on the 
accuracy of the regression results. Consequently, this paper used panel data regression with 
fixed effect to eliminate the impact of omitted variables (Hsiao, 2006). The results of the 
regression analysis for the 4242 observations are shown in table 3. To identify the relationship 
between pre-managed earnings and discretionary accruals, an additional regression was 
performed for the two categories of negative and positive pre-managed earnings. The division 
of two pre-managed earnings groups (positive and negative) can specifically reveal the 
reaction of charities depending on the sign of the financial results (Verbruggen and 
Christiaens, 2012). 
[Table 3 is about here] 
The relationship between discretionary accruals andearnings before discretionary 
accruals was negative for the whole sample, and also for the case of negative and positive pre-
managed earnings. In accordance with previous findings and conclusions about the negative 
relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings before discretionary accruals (Leone 
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and Van Horn, 2005; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012), charities appear to pay close 
attention to the disclosure of the financial bottom line. If there is a high likelihood that the 
financial statements will report surpluses (deficits), there appears to be an adjustment of 
discretionary accruals downwards (upwards) to ensure a esult that is close to zero. These 
results support the second hypothesis that charities manage earnings upwards when pre-
managed earnings are negative and downwards when pre-managed earnings are positive. The 
coefficient for this relationship is higher when pre-managed earnings are negative in 
comparison with positive pre-managed earnings (-0.89 vs. -0.58), implying that in years with 
deficit results, charities may appear to be slightly more aggressive in applying accruals to 
manage earnings upwards than in years with positive results. 
The results of this paper are consistent with Leone and Van Horn (2005)’s results from 
8,179 observations in US hospitals, which suggested that earnings before discretionary 
accrual are in a negative relation with discretionary ccruals, leading the reported earnings 
(the sum of earnings before discretionary accrual and discretionary accruals) to be closed to 
zero. This means that discretionary accruals were applied to adjust earnings towards zero 
depending on the positive or negative pre-managed earnings. These results are also 
compatible with Verbruggen and Christiaens (2012) in the context of Belgian non-profit 
organisations. These authors also found that Belgian NPOs exercised discretionary accruals to 
drive the bottom line item (earnings) in favour of zero reporting. The coefficients of EBDA 
(earnings before discretionary accruals) are negatively related to discretionary accruals in the 
case of both negative and positive EBDA, and this value is higher in the case of negative 
EBDA. The previous papers found that non-profit organisations are engaged in earnings 
management by managing earnings toward zero, and this finding can thus be extended to the 
wider constituency of UK charities. This may indicate  systemic managerial concern with the 
bottom-line result and the underlying message and image it might convey to external 
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stakeholders, particularly sponsors, donors, beneficiaries and regulators. These results chime 
with instrumental stakeholder theory in that it suggests that charities may be behave in a 
specific manner (managing the bottom-line items) in order to satisfy particular stakeholders, 
such as sponsors, donors and regulators. Also, this practice can be explained by motivations 
to retain resources for operation and minimise scrutiny or intervention by regulatory bodies, 
even in the presence of accounting and governance regulation. A more detailed analysis is 
presented in relation to the different sectors in a subsequent section.  
The results from this study appear to be consistent with prior findings indicating that 
NPOs might re-allocate expenditure (Khumawala et al., 2005; Jones and Roberts, 2006; 
Krishnan et al., 2006; Keating et al., 2008), manage specific expenditure items (for example, 
actuarial assumption and depreciation) (Pellicer et al., 2014), manage discretionary accruals 
(Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012) or even smooth their income 
(Boterenbrood, 2014). Moreover, previous year earnings and past discretionary accruals also 
have an effect on discretionary accruals in the current year.  
d. Hypothesis 3: Leverage and earnings management 
The statistical analysis in table 3 suggests that leverage has a negative relationship 
with discretionary accruals. The results are signifcant for both positive and negative 
unmanaged earnings. This implies that charities with an increasing level of leverage consider 
managing earnings downwards in cases of operational surpluses, and when unmanaged 
earnings are negative, charities appear to manage deficits upwards. The reaction of charities in 
the presence of leverage not only supports Hypothesis 3, but also lends credence to the second 
hypothesis in that targeting zero earnings is an intention of charities. Hence, charities again 
show an aim of managing earnings toward zero, but one that is more robust in the presence of 
higher financial obligations. In this respect, Hypothesis 3 is supported.  
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In order to test the relationship between leverage nd earnings management, another 
analysis was conducted using the absolute value of discretionary accruals as the dependent 
variable (Davidson et al., 2005; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Chen and Zhang, 2014). The 
detailed results in table 4 show a significantly positive association between the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals and leverage. This indicates that the higher the charity leverage, the 
more it uses discretionary accruals to manage financial performance to a favourable level. 
This finding clarifies the mixed findings from prio studies with regard to the relationship 
between leverage and earnings management (Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 
2013), and partly supports the US-based finding by Vermeer et al. (2014) that managers of 
NPOs with higher leverage appear to manage income upwards. 
e. Impact of other factors on earnings management  
In order to assess the impact of other factors on ear ings management of UK charities, 
this study consider several factors including sectoral differences, different types of funding, 
charity size as well as the impact of the global financial crisis.   
First, a regression analysis on a sectoral basis was implemented to identify indications 
of different EM behaviour on a sectoral basis, and the results are reported in table 5 below. 
[Table 5 is about here] 
The results reveal that earnings before discretionary accruals are negatively associated 
with discretionary accrual for different sectors. These results are robust for hypotheses 1 and 
2 in that charities prefer to report earnings around zero, and discretionary accruals have been 
applied in order to manage earnings to this favourable level. Moreover, in order to distinguish 
the differences of managing discretionary accruals to adjust reported earnings amongst 
different sectors, an alternative regression (of model 2) using dummy variables representing 
eleven sectors and their interaction with earnings before discretionary accruals is implemented. 
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However, the results are not statistically significant and no decisive conclusion can be reached 
on sectoral differences with regard to earnings management. 
In addition, leverage has a negative association with earnings management for all 
groups of charities; the result is consistent with the findings in supporting hypothesis 3 above. 
In order to examine the differences in impact of leverage on earnings management among 
these groups, an additional regression using the absolute value of discretionary accruals as 
dependent variable is conducted. The results suggest that except for group 7 (Law, advocacy 
and politics) and group 11 (Business and professional associations, unions), the results 
showed a significantly positive association between l verage and absolute value of 
discretionary accruals among the other groups. Thisimplies that leverage may not be a factor 
influencing earnings management behaviour in all sectors.  
In respect of other control variables, the results from Table 3 indicate that 
organizational size (measured by total assets) is negatively and significantly associated with 
discretionary accruals, and this relationship is similar to the specific case of pre-managed 
surpluses, but not for charities reporting pre-managed deficits. In order to confirm this 
relationship, an alternative test of the absolute value of discretionary accruals was conducted 
as suggested by prior studies (Davidson et al., 2005; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Chen and 
Zhang, 2014). The results (in table 4) show a negative ssociation between size and absolute 
value of discretionary accruals. This result suggests that larger charities are less likely to be 
involved in earnings management and may proxy for the possibility that a higher level of 
professionalism, reputational awareness and governance (e.g. external trustee members) is 
present in such charities; thereby curbing the potential for higher levels of earnings 
management. 
Finally this study considers how the global financil crisis impacts on earnings 
management by UK charities by splitting the data ino two periods, period 1 (2008-2009) and 
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period 2 (2010-2012), to explore for any differences in the practice of earnings management 
by UK charities. However, the results did not suggest any significant difference in earnings 
management practice between two periods.  
f. Sensitivity analysis and robustness tests 
In order to ensure the validity of the empirical results determined from the various 
regression models, we conducted several sensitivity analyses and robustness tests, which 
included applying the two-stage least square (2SLS) method to minimise the impact of 
endogeneity, changing the independent variables measuring the source of income, and 
implementing an additional test of specific accrual (depreciation) rather than relying on 
overall discretionary accruals. The 2SLS regression is based on the assumption of a potential 
endogenous relationship between earnings before discretionary accruals and income growth 
and consistently displays that two variables: EBDA and LEV are negatively associated with 
dependent variable: discretionary accruals (table 6). 
In addition, it was suggested by Leone and Van Horn (2005) that there may be a 
mechanical correlation between DA and EBDA from model 2. This study therefore proposes 
a new proxy for EBDA (namely NEW_EBDAit) which is equal to 1 if earnings before the 
discretionary accrual of charity i in period t scaled by Total Assets in period t-1 is greater than 
zero, and zero otherwise. The results also show a neg tive association between discretionary 
accruals and NEW_EBDA, as well as a negative relationship between leverage and 
discretionary accruals. While the significance of dif erent income sources shows the same 
results as the main tests, size is not significantly re ated to EM. Nonetheless, these results 
once again show robust support for the second and third hypotheses. 
Lastly, this study considers the specific case of ‘abnormal depreciation’ as a specific 
accrual to examine whether charities use depreciation as a tool for earnings management. 
Recently, Pellicer et al. (2014) conducted a study in UK public sector b dies and suggested 
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that depreciation is the main method by which local government entities manage accounting 
numbers. These findings may be considered in the context of UK charities since depreciation 
is a part of total resources expended. Abnormal depreciation is determined based on the 
assumption that the proportion of depreciation over gross property, plant and equipment is 
constant. In consequence, the over- or under-depreciated amount represents an abnormal 
depreciation. This figure is used to test the relationship between unexpected depreciation and 
earnings before unexpected depreciation; similar to discretionary accrual, the charities may 
over- or under-record depreciation for the purpose f managing earnings downward or 
upward. The results are consistent with and provide support for the main results from model 2. 
Depreciation thus appears to be one of the accounting tools charities use to adjust outgoing 
resources. 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper sought to investigate whether UK charities engage in earnings management 
practices, and if so, what are the key organisationl determinants influencing the extent of 
earnings management practices. By relying on stakehold r theory and resource dependence 
theory, mainstream measures of earnings management (distribution of reported earnings, 
discretionary accruals) and a relatively large data set from 1,414 charities over a five-year 
period, this study finds clear evidence that the repo ted bottom lines of UK charities are: (i) 
distributed narrowly around the zero level, but with an attention to display positive (surplus) 
rather than negative (deficit) results; and (ii) subject to discretionary accrual tactics of an 
upwards or downwards nature in order to manage earnings closer to zero level. Furthermore, 
the extent of discretionary accruals is found to fluctuate on the basis of leverage, 
organizational size and type of activity (sector). This is the first UK study which considers a 
relatively large and diversified sample of charities and as such provides evidence of a 
systemic behaviour in the reporting of the accounting bottom line.  
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The findings are consistent with prior research claiming that non-profit organisations 
have various incentives to manage accounting figures by different techniques such as 
misclassifying functional expenditures to improve programme ratio and/or lower fundraising 
costs and lessen administrative expenses (Yetman, 2001; Jones and Roberts, 2006; Krishnan 
et al., 2006; Keating et al., 2008; Tinkelman, 2009; Yetman and Yetman, 2012), using 
discretionary accruals to manage earnings towards the zero level (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; 
Ballantine et al., 2007; Verbruggen and Christiaens, 2012; Jegers, 2013). This paper finds that 
a number of UK charities reported small positive earnings (surplus) or little losses around 
zero (hypothesis 1). When the results show a significa t surplus or considerable deficits, 
discretionary accrual may be applied in order to direct earnings toward zero (hypothesis 2). 
This level is not a statutory benchmark, but it provides a way for charity trustees to balance 
resources and expenditure as well as demonstrate efficiency in their operations. Moreover, 
this study suggests that leverage has an association with discretionary accruals (hypothesis 3). 
This finding thus posits that charities with a large amount of debt and credit obligations seem 
to be more likely to be involved in EM. This is a significant result in that previous NPO 
studies did not find support for the effect of leverage on EM behaviour. These findings were 
found to be robust by testing for abnormal depreciation as a specific accrual, considering the 
use of alternative independent variables and relying o  the two-stage least square (2SLS) 
method.  
In spite of their economic importance and valuable findings from an emerging 
literature, little is known about the financial reporting practices of non-profit organisations in 
the UK. This study attributes this to the absence of a comprehensive financial database for 
UK charities compared to the United States for insta ce. As a result, the findings and analysis 
of this study have key implications. First, stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory 
provide a very useful theoretical framework to understand the wider motivations behind 
35 
 
earnings management in a non-profit context and to analyse the results thereof. In particular, 
the combination of an instrumental perspective on stakeholder theory and resource 
dependence theory can substitute for agency theory in explaining the varying behaviour of 
non-profit executives. For example, the target repoting of close to zero earnings in UK 
charities might be motivated by consideration of key stakeholders and uncertainties in 
accessing future resources. Second, while the UK context can be characterised as one where 
the regulatory framework of accounting for charities is highly developed (indeed, it has 
inspired reforms in other countries), the evidence reinforces the view that accrual accounting 
can also offer the potential for discretionary behaviour by NPOs. Whilst not a novel insight in 
itself, this finding will be of interest to the Charity Commission, which may help strengthen 
its monitoring activities by taking into account the extent of discretionary accrual practices 
adopted by charities. Since it carries out a regime risk-based inspections, the extent of EM 
may indirectly highlight concerns about internal practices and governance in such an 
organisation.  
However, there are some limitations in terms of the data relied upon in this paper. 
There is insufficient information on the specific providers of income, which, if available, 
would have allowed for a more rigorous analysis of the impact of different stakeholders and 
resource providers on earnings management behaviour. Also, the empirical results from this 
study would be more informative if cash flow data could be collected, thereby enabling the 
use of other discretionary accrual metrics and models such as the Modified Jones model, the 
Dechow and Dichev approach or the Francis model. Nonetheless, the results provide 
sufficient evidence to spur the debate on the reliability of SORP-based accounting 
information in the UK charitable context. 
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Endnotes 
1. NPO is a generic term for all third sector organis tions which do not distribute profits or surpluses 
for the benefit of members, shareholders or other financial motivated stakeholders. Most NPOs 
typically operate under the constraint of ‘non-diviend distribution’ although that many of them 
generate profits or surpluses. In the UK context, NPOs comprise of two types of organisational 
structures, (i) charities and community groups and (ii) social enterprises. However, in this study, we 
focus on charities as a main player of UK NPOs. (Source: 
https://www.resourcecentre.org.uk/information/legal-structures-for-not-for-profit-organisations/). 
2. For example, in August 2012 a charity named ‘Fund for the Blind and Partially Sighted’ was 
convicted of theft and misleading information to the Commission under the Charities Act, and in 
another case AA Hamilton College Limited, a higher education college, was found to employ poor 
financial controls and unauthorised benefits due to the fact that two trustees were employed as staff 
members (Source: Charity Commission: Annual reports and Account 2012–13, p.11). 
3. http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk 
4. According to ‘What is the sector’s contribution t  the economy?’ published by NCVO at 
http://data.ncvo.org.uk/a/almanac14/what-is-the-sectors-contribution-to-the-economy/ 
5. SORP for charity accounting was initially prepared and issued by the Accounting Standard 
Committee (ASC) in 1988 with a ‘Statement of Recommended Practice No 2 (Accounting by 
Charities)’ – SORP 2. 
6. http://data.ncvo.org.uk/a/almanac12/what-impact-did-the-recession-have-upon-the-voluntary-sector/ 
7. http://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/dec/09/one-in-six-charities-close 
8. ‘Earnings’ is a general term indicating the operational result of charities, according to SORP 2005, 
defined as ‘Net incoming/outgoing resources before transfers’. It is determined by total incoming 
resources minus total resources expended. 
9. Other sources of charity income include investment income and other incoming resources.  
10. The authors sought permission from the UK Charity Commission to use the database for research 
purposes. This database is now publicly available at http://data.charitycommission.gov.uk/default.aspx  
11. The data collected from the UK Charity Commission with a permission to be used for research 
purpose. 
12. Because of the extreme kurtosis and significant skewness problems, a winsorizing of the two 
variables (EBDAit and EARNINGSit-1) at 5% was performed to resolve these issues. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
Items (in GBP) Mean Standard 
deviation 
Perc.25 Median Perc.75 
Total Asset 57,032,080 433,405,636 3,206,022 12,256,266 35,462,014 
Total Liability 14,146,786 82,844,491 388,603 2,213,000 7,005,074 
Leverage 29.64% 29.72% 8.31% 22.10% 42.27% 
Total Income 20,719,039 47,244,579 2,143,567 10,558,425 19,965,408 
Charitable Income 11,979,547 31,966,269 431,490 2,875,614 13,055,562 
Voluntary Income 5,903,279 24,787,801 11,000 324,523 2,685,093 
Earnings (Surplus/Deficits) 546,054 16,562,740 - 54,680 172,649 977,001 
Charitable Income/Total 
Income 
58.10% 40.36% 8.87% 76.08% 96.09% 
Voluntary income/Total 
income 
26.02% 33.92% 0.21% 5.32% 50.17% 
Earnings/Total assets 2.2% 44.16% -0.98% 2.49% 6.84% 
N = 1414 charities (7,070 observations) 
 Variables N Mean Std. dev. Min Median Max 
DA it 4242 0.000000 0.108505 -0.875694 0.003989 0.477413 
EBDAit 4242 0.036929 0.114020 -0.161457 0.019982 0.310464 
EARNINGSi,t-1 4242 0.037679 0.088504 -0.115804 0.024619 0.264029 
DA i,t-1 4242 0.000000 0.112011 -0.875694 0.006449 0.604326 
LEV it 4242 0.292466 0.286316 0 0.219712 4.443969 
VOL_INCit 4242 0.2614498 0.342187 0 0.051851 1 
CHAR_INCit 4242 0.5841176 0.404393 0 0.761319
9 
1 
Sizeit 4242 16.15339 1.811005 10.58266 16.32477 23.45875 
DA it is the residual from the Jones model (equation 1). EBDAit is earnings before discretionary accruals = 
Earningsit/Total assetsi,,t-1 – Discretionary accruals. EARNINGSi,,t-1 is earnings in year t-1 scaled by lagged 
total assets. DAi,,t-1 is discretionary accruals in year t-1. LEVit is total short-term and long-term creditor in year 
t scaled by total assets in year t-1. CHAR_INCit is a proportion of charitable income over total income in year 
t. VOL_INCit is a proportion of voluntary income over total income in year t. Sizeit is the natural logarithm of 
the total assets of charity i in year t. The data for model 2 is limited to 4242 observations (1414 charities 
across 3 years) as DAit is available for 2010 to 2012 and DAi,t-1 is available for 2009 to 2011 (lagged assets). 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics per charity sector (2008 to 2012)  
Items  Statistics Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 Group 8 Group 9 Group 10 Group 11 
 N 655 1705 620 1055 320 850 200 450 270 700 245 
Total Asset (£’000) Mean 24,100 76,800 34,200 29,600 41,900 58,000 8,315 191,000 29,500 56,000 26,100 
Std. Deviation 55,100 819,000 80,800 68,200 136,000 116,000 20,700 559,000 68,900 74,900 37,800 
Median 5,674 16,900 8,732 5,695 8,762 16,000 762 20,600 11,100 27,900 13,600 
Total Liability 
(£’000) 
Mean 7,565 16,200 11,400 4,911 5,694 38,600 2,074 27,600 8,997 5,257 6,748 
Std. Deviation 33,200 137,000 45,300 10,500 15,600 81,300 5,411 129,000 30,200 14,300 10,400 
Median 1,537 4,367 967 1,161 910 4,545 217 1,595 2,669 1,593 3,496 
Leverage (%) Mean 37% 32% 20% 27% 22% 50% 29% 22% 30% 13% 31% 
Std. Deviation 31% 22% 20% 25% 28% 45% 19% 26% 24% 17% 43% 
Median 30% 28% 13% 20% 11% 40% 27% 10% 24% 6% 23% 
Total Income (£’000) Mean 17,800 19,100 24,500 21,400 22,500 23,000 10,000 18,900 52,900 12,700 16,600 
Std. Deviation 54,500 39,500 65,900 38,800 55,700 37,400 18,900 49,900 104,000 15,300 18,200 
Median 8,555 11,700 6,215 9,476 4,900 13,100 1,247 6,025 23,200 10,300 11,900 
Charitable Income 
(£’000) 
Mean 6,644 13,200 15,100 13,500 8,111 20,100 6,798 5,343 19,000 3,722 12,200 
Std. Deviation 9,912 22,600 56,600 25,700 30,900 33,800 15,600 33,800 74,300 8,500 15,700 
Median 2,549 10,000 1,601 2,660 805 11,600 895 - 1,174 704 9,390 
Voluntary Income 
(£’000) 
Mean 7,603 3,059 7,238 5,630 10,300 1,291 1,435 7,722 29,800 6,934 324 
Std. Deviation 38,400 20,700 34,400 18,300 22,300 7,691 4,325 32,100 46,600 11,700 851 
Median 546 116 1,025 276 962 2 67 688 11,100 3,055 6 
Earnings 
(Surplus/Deficits) 
(£’000) 
Mean 761 -409 971 637 889 778 425 2,200 845 483 813 
Std. Deviation 4,120 29,600 6,182 4,639 4,191 5,841 1,945 26,200 7,801 5,315 3,055 
Median 56 438 208 80 124 198 31 78 373 67 242 
Charitable 
Income/Total Income 
(%) 
Mean 51.57% 78.67% 47.60% 64.79% 35.39% 81.03% 70.49% 21.88% 27.91% 22.64% 71.20% 
Std. Deviation 32.35% 32.46% 38.69% 38.35% 34.49% 30.13% 37.34% 37.84% 37.24% 29.63% 30.96% 
Median 52.58% 93.96% 37.05% 84.60% 28.05% 95.78% 91.99% 0.00% 2.99% 7.81% 87.25% 
Voluntary 
Income/Total Income 
(%) 
Mean 28.70% 11.91% 31.36% 22.43% 41.07% 8.14% 21.19% 38.58% 63.29% 59.61% 5.27% 
Std. Deviation 29.83% 24.80% 30.24% 30.35% 35.23% 19.91% 32.70% 39.68% 40.04% 32.99% 15.04% 
Median 18.28% 1.18% 24.94% 5.86% 35.86% 0.07% 2.24% 21.36% 85.90% 70.11% 0.17% 
Group: 1. Culture and Recreation; 2. Education and Research; 3. Health; 4. Social Services; 5. Environment; 6. Development and Housing; 7. Law, Advocacy nd
Politics; 8. Philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion; 9. International; 10. Religion; 11. Business and professional associations, unions. 
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Table 3: Regression results on entire sample  
Regression 
DA 
  All EBDA Positive EBDA Negative EBDA 
Variables Exp.n Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value 
INTERCEPT  1.01 3.24 1.28 8.55 -0.03 -0.12 
EBDAit - -0.64 -23.63*** -0.58 -20.76*** -0.89 -12.96*** 
EARNINGSi,t-1  -0.16 -5.33*** -0.11 -3.71*** -0.06 -1.59 
DA i,t-1  -0.24 -11.87*** -0.22 -11.49*** -0.15 -7.15*** 
LEV it - -0.25 -4.42*** -0.17 -9.93*** -0.37 -10.22*** 
VOL_INCit - 0.07 2.25*** 0.06 2.36** 0.08 1.98** 
CHAR_INCit - 0.003 0.17 -0.01 -0.68 0.024 0.86 
Size  -0.06 -3.03*** -0.07 -7.05*** 0.006 0.36 
Sector 1  0.0049 0.57     
Sector 2  0.0052 0.66     
Sector 3  -0.0060 -0.69     
Sector 4  -0.0010 -0.12     
Sector 5  -0.0057 -0.58     
Sector 6  0.0083 0.99     
Sector 7  -0.0004 -0.04     
Sector 8  -0.0109 -1.18     
Sector 9  -0.0017 -0.17     
Sector 10  -0.0151 -1.70     
N  4242  2551  1691  
R square  0.1312  0.0249  0.0215  
F-value   139.46   115.74   46.06   
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
VIF maximum  2.97  2.76  2.73  
***, **: Significance at 1% and 5% level. 
DA it is discretionary accruals in year t. EBDAit is earnings before discretionary accruals. EARNINGSi,t-1 is earnings 
in year t-1 scaled by lagged total assets. DAi,t-1 is discretionary accruals in year t-1. LEVit is total short-term and long-
term creditor in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1. CHAR_INCit is proportion of charitable income over total 
income in year t. VOL_INCit is proportion of voluntary income over total income in year t. Sizeit is the natural 
logarithm of total assets of charity i in year t. Sector is a dummy variable. 
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Table 4: Regression results with dependent variable s the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals 
Variables Coef. t 
EBDA it 0.094 8.07** 
EARNING i,t -1 0.045 2.79** 
DA i,t-1 0.016 1.51 
VOL_INC it -0.010 -0.69 
CHAR_INC it -0.010 -0.8 
LEV it 0.048 4.44** 
Size -0.024 -3.71** 
Constant 0.443 4.27** 
N 4242 
F(7,2821) 19.12 
Prob > F 0.0000 
R square 0.1447 
**, *: Significance at 1% and 5% level. 
Dependent variable is absolute value of discretionary accruals in year t. EBDAit is earnings before discretionary 
accruals. EARNINGSi,t-1 is earnings in year t-1 scaled by lagged total assets. DAi,t-1 is discretionary accruals in 
year t-1. LEVit is total short-term and long-term creditor in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1. CHAR_INCit is 
proportion of charitable income over total income in year t. VOL_INCit is proportion of voluntary income over 
total income in year t. Sizeit is the natural logarithm of total assets of charity i n year t.  
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Table 5: Regression results by sector  
 Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
EBDAit -0.68*** -0.43*** -0.58*** -0.64*** -0.73*** -0.64*** -1.13*** -0.62*** -0.89*** -0.30*** -0.71*** 
EARNINGSi,t-1 -0.23*** -0.15*** -0.11** -0.03 -0.07 -0.10 -0.15 -0.18** -0.34** -0.02 -0.29*** 
DAi,t-1 -0.19*** -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.24*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.22*** 
LEV it -0.41*** -0.22*** -0.65*** -0.44*** -0.80*** -0.07 *** -0.53*** -0.39*** -0.50*** -0.19*** -0.15*** 
VOL_INCit 0.05 0.03 0.18** 0.03 0.19 0.12** 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.06** 0.00 
CHAR_INCit -0.06 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
Size -0.05 -0.02 -0.14*** -0.08*** -0.21*** -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.23*** -0.02 -0.02 
INTERCEPT 0.96 0.46 2.25 1.42 3.56 0.43 0.31 -0.34 3.91 0.32 0.45 
N 393 1023 372 633 192 510 120 270 162 420 147 
R-square 0.244 0.17 0.04 0.1023 0.0196 0.244 0.616 0.149 0.11 0.34 0.337 
F 66.38 75.47 57.54 68.26 23.66 88.59 43.29 30.70 20.67 27.72 34.79 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
***, **, *: Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level  
DA it is the current year’s discretionary accrual. EBDAit is earnings before discretionary accruals. EARNINGSi,t-1 is earnings in year t-1 scaled by lagged total assets. 
DA i,t-1 is discretionary accruals in year t-1. LEVit is total short-term and long-term creditor in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1. CHAR_INCit is the proportion of 
charitable income over total income in year t. VOL_INCit is proportion of voluntary income over total income in year t. Sizeit is the natural logarithm of total assets of 
charity i in year t. 
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Table 6: Sensitivity analysis results 
Variables  Description 2SLS 
Coef. 
EBDA it Earnings before discretionary accruals -0.238*** 
EARNING i,t-1 Earnings in year t-1 0.056** 
DA i,t-1 Discretionary accruals in year t-1 -0.167*** 
LEV it Leverage  -0.049*** 
VOL_INC it Proportion of voluntary income  0.007 
CHAR_INC it Proportion of charitable income  0.008 
Size Natural log of total assets of charity i in year t. -0.001 
Intercept  0.024 
F  21.92 
Prob > F  0.0000 
R-square  0.1443 
Significance at 1% level (***) and 5% level (**) 
Dependent variable: DAit: Discretionary accruals 
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Figure 1: Frequency distribution of reported earnings and pre-managed earnings (2009 to 
2012, N = 5656) 
Frequency distribution of reported earnings over lagged total assets 
 
Frequency distribution of pre-managed earnings over lagged total assets 
 
An F-test with null hypothesis was performed to test he differences between means and variances for rep rted 
earnings and pre-managed earnings. The results show that the means of reported earnings and un-managed 
earnings are not significantly different (p-value > 0.05), but the variances of those values are different at a 
significance level of less than 0.05. 
 
 
 
